A Merchant Republic in a World of Empires
In the mid-17th century, the Dutch Republic was a commercial giant surrounded by ambitious monarchies. Spain was fading, but England and France were rising, eager to challenge Dutch sea power and trade.
Johan de Witt, as Holland’s leading statesman, had to answer a brutal question: how does a small, rich, vulnerable republic survive between larger, hungrier neighbors?
Peace First, Whenever Possible
From the start, De Witt believed war was bad business. As the voice of the merchant and patrician class, he pushed a foreign policy that prioritized peace, because every conflict endangered shipping and strained the economy.
His ally Pieter de la Court even joked in The Interest of Holland that the lion in the Dutch coat of arms should be replaced by a cat — an animal more interested in quiet prosperity than in roaring conquest.
Ending the First Anglo-Dutch War
When De Witt took de facto control in 1653, the Republic was already locked in a costly naval war with England. Dutch ports were blockaded, trade crippled and confidence shaken.
Working closely with Cornelis de Graeff and other leaders, De Witt pushed for a quick peace. The Treaty of Westminster in 1654 ended the First Anglo-Dutch War and restored breathing space for commerce — though at the secret price of the Act of Seclusion, barring the young William III from the Holland stadholdership, a move demanded by Oliver Cromwell.
Protecting the Baltic Lifeline
Trade was not just about oceans. De Witt understood the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea, gateway for crucial naval supplies like timber and tar. In 1658–59, he sent large Dutch fleets to support Denmark against Sweden in the Second Northern War.
His aim was clear: keep the Øresund strait open so Dutch merchant ships could pass freely. Military intervention here was less about glory than about safeguarding the arteries of Dutch maritime power.
Reforming the Navy, Neglecting the Army
Facing renewed conflict with England after the restoration of Charles II in 1660, De Witt focused on naval strength. He modernized the Dutch fleet, commissioning larger, more heavily armed warships modeled on English designs.
After an initial defeat at Lowestoft, he even briefly took command at sea himself, enduring such severe seasickness that Christiaan Huygens designed a special non-rocking hammock for him. Under his direction, the famed admiral Michiel de Ruyter took command, leading to spectacular successes such as the 1667 Raid on the Medway, when Dutch cannon fire could be heard in London.
Yet this maritime focus had a downside. While the navy flourished, the Dutch States Army was neglected — a dangerous oversight in a Europe where land-hungry monarchs, especially France under Louis XIV, eyed the Low Countries.
Balancing France and England — Until It Broke
De Witt tried to manage France with cautious friendship, seeking safety by leaning slightly toward Louis XIV without granting him too much on the southern frontier. He preferred a Spanish-ruled buffer in the Spanish Netherlands to a direct border with powerful France.
In 1668, he engineered the Triple Alliance with England and Sweden, a collective warning to France not to seize the entire Spanish Netherlands. To avoid offending Louis, he insisted that some of the harshest terms be hidden in a secret clause.
What he did not realize was that Charles II of England had entered the alliance only to break Dutch-French ties. A month later, Charles secretly revealed the clause to Louis XIV. The two monarchs then concluded the Treaty of Dover, agreeing to attack the Dutch Republic together.
When their combined blow fell in 1672, the careful web of De Witt’s diplomacy snapped — and with it, the safety of the state he had tried so hard to shield.
