A Worldview Against the Modern World
Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, preached an Islam stripped of modern science and secular knowledge. In a 2009 interview, he dismissed the theory of evolution, denied that the Earth is spherical, and rejected the idea that rain comes from evaporation. For him, rain fell because God directly created and sent it.
These were not just eccentric beliefs. They symbolised a wholesale rejection of the intellectual and scientific frameworks associated with Western modernity. Boko Haram blamed Westernisation for Nigeria’s entrenched corruption and insisted that only an Islamic state implementing strict sharia could restore justice.
Salafi Jihadism in the Lake Chad Basin
The group draws on Salafi jihadism—a current within Sunni Islam that idealises the earliest Muslim generations, rejects “innovations” in religion, and supports violent struggle to build an Islamic polity.
For Boko Haram, that means erasing modern states and national borders in favour of a revived caliphate. They openly reject nationalism; when they pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, IS propagated that it was their “rejection of nationalism” that bound them together.
The Power of Takfir
Mainstream Islamic teaching strictly limits when someone can be declared an apostate. Killing or enslaving fellow Muslims is forbidden. This presents a problem for any insurgent who wants to overthrow a government and fight an army made up largely of Muslims.
Boko Haram’s answer is takfir: declaring self‑professed Muslims to be unbelievers. Under Abubakar Shekau, the group weaponised this doctrine. Sufi Muslims, Shiites, even ordinary Sunnis who did not support the jihad were labelled infidels.
With one word—“apostate”—they turned killing Muslim soldiers, officials, and even civilians into what they portrayed as a religious obligation. Collateral deaths no longer troubled them; those who failed to join their jihad were, in Shekau’s eyes, already guilty.
Expanding the Circle of Enemies
Researchers Jacob Zenna and Zacharias Pier describe how, after 2010, Shekau considered active participation in jihad obligatory. Not joining was itself apostasy.
This thinking reshaped the target list. Christians and state institutions remained priorities, but by late 2010 Muslim preachers—especially Salafis who criticised Boko Haram—were being assassinated almost weekly in northeastern Nigeria. Civil servants, policemen, and soldiers were fair game. Mosques, beer halls, banks, and prisons were bombed or raided.
In one 2016 speech to his commanders, Shekau declared that even a woman who prays and fasts can be captured in battle if she “engages in democracy.” Participation in the electoral system alone was enough, in his logic, to void her claim to Islam.
A Break With Other Jihadists
This extremism ultimately caused a rupture with the Islamic State itself. When IS tried to replace Shekau in 2016 with Abu Musab al‑Barnawi, one stated reason was Shekau’s “wide‑reaching interpretation of takfir” and his indiscriminate targeting of Muslim civilians.
Al‑Qaeda’s leadership had long held similar reservations. Though Boko Haram fighters trained with al‑Qaeda affiliates and fought alongside them in Mali, al‑Qaeda central never formally accepted the group as an official branch—largely because Shekau treated nearly the entire Nigerian Muslim population as non‑Muslim.
Faith as a Weapon
In Boko Haram’s hands, doctrine is more than belief; it is a toolkit for war. By stretching takfir beyond traditional bounds, the group unlocked an almost limitless license to kill.
Understanding that logic does not excuse it—but without grasping how religious concepts are twisted into weapons, it is hard to see why compromise, ceasefires, or appeals from mainstream Islamic leaders have so often shattered against Boko Haram’s uncompromising theology.